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in the harbor sank or that the waves generated by the storm were so severe that they would have
contributed to the loss regardless of the incomplete engine work .
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of s ummary
judgment for Progressive. It also held that Hart presented no genuine issue of material fact
because he failed to present evidence to refute Progressive's prima facie showing of negligence
that Hart's inadequate maintenance was the dominant cause of the FOOT L OOSE's sinking.
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COURT OF APPEALS REJECTS DISTRICT COURT'S ENFORCEMENT OF
OVERBROAD EXCULPATORY CLAUSE
The United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit reversed the district
court's decision to narrow and enforce defendant's overbroad exculpatory
clause. The court considered the clause's boiler-plate nature, over-breadth,
lack of clarity, and attorney fee structure in deciding that enforcement would
be against public policy.
Mark Broadley v. Mashpee Neck Marina, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit
471 F.3d 272
(Decided December 22, 2006)
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mark Broadley ("Broadley"), brought a negligence action in the
United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Mashpee Neck Marina
("Marina"), for injuries sustained as a result of improper dock maintenance. Broadley, who
rented a seasonal mooring at the marina, fractured his ankle when his foot became trapped
between a fixed dock and the attached floating dock where his vessel was moored. Broadley
alleged that the Marina was responsible for the accident because the Marina could have
prevented exposing dock gaps by affixing a flexible material to the topside of the docks or
ensuring the docks themselves were · more tightly secured.
The Marina contended that
Broadley's negligence claim was barred by the exculpatory clause contained in the rental
agreement. Broadley contended that admiralty law prohibits use of exculpatory clauses which
completely immunize against ordinary negligence or bar claims for gross negligence or
intentional wrongdoing. S. C. State Ports A uth. ., v. Silver Anchor, S.A., 23 F.3d 842, 846 n. 3 (4th
Cir. 1994). The exculpatory clause read :

The OWNER [Broadley] warrants and [covenants] that . . . the OWNER . . . will [not] make
any claims, demands, causes of action of any kind and nature, or obtain or enforce any
judgments, executions or levies thereon . . . against MARINA, its officers, directors, agents,
servants, or its employees, arising out of any damage, loss, personal injury or death
suffered by [him]. . . The OWNER . .. agree [s] and covenant [s] that [he] will defend,
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indemnify and save MARINA hannless from any and all of such claims, demands, causes
of action, judgments and executions, and the MARINA shall be entitled to responsible
attorneys fees in the event of breach of the OWNER's covenant hereunder.
The district court decided to narrow the overbroad exculpatory clause and apply it to the
extent it covered claims for ordinary negligence. Since Broadley asserted no claim for gross
negligence or reckless negligence, the district court granted summary judgment for the Marina.
On appeal, Broadley reasserted that controlling admiralty law prohibits clauses which fully
immunize against ordinary negligence; for support, Broadley cites the Supreme Court's decision
in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955), and the 1st circuits decision in La
Esperanza de P.R. . , Inc v. Perez Y Cia de P.R., Inc., 124 F.3d 10 (l5t Cir.1997).
Bisso, which was decided in the context of towing contracts and specifically concerned
with the threat of "monopolistic compulsion," has been unevenly applied between circuits. Two
circuits plainly accept Bisso and would allow a release for negligence. One circuit limits Bisso
to situations of unequal bargaining power. La Esperanza, a 1st circuit decision, upheld an
exculpatory clause focused on ordinary negligence. The court reasoned that application was
proper so long as the terms were "expressed clearly in contracts entered into freely by parties of
equal bargaining power." !d. at 19. As a result, the Court of Appeals surmised that absent a
showing of unequal bargaining power, a narrowly tailored exculpatory clause which bars claims
for ordinary negligence should be upheld.
The cases cited by Broadley were only of marginal support, for he never alleged unequal
bargaining power. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals continued its inquiry. The Court of
Appeals questioned the appropriateness of the district court's decision to reform and then enforce
the overbroad exculpatory clause. The Restatement 2nd of Contracts § 184 provides for situations
where a contract is overbroad. "A court may treat only part of a term as unenforceable .. .if the
party who seeks to enforce the term obtained it in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing." However, a comment to the rule further advises that, "the fact that
the [overbroad] term is contained in a standard form supplied by the dominant party argues
against aiding him in this request." !d. § 184 cmt. b.
The Court of Appeals relies on the Restatement 2nd as an analytical starting point and
continued to consider the remaining public policy concerns. If enforced, the Court of Appeals
reasoned that the over-breadth of the clause would discourage legitimate claims for reckless,
gross, and intentional negligence that would otherwise have been brought. Additionally, since
the clause lacked clear and express reference to negligence suits, it provided inadequate warning
to the contracting party. Lastly, the portion of the clause transferring Marina's attorney fees to
the party bringing suit was an unwarranted deterrent. Without the guidance of controlling case
law, the Court of Appeals decided that it would not be proper to uphold the overbroad
exculpatory clause under these conditions. The Court of Appeals further extended all of the
previously mentioned criteria to reject application of the contract's severability clause. The case
was reversed and remanded for further proceedings, with each side bearing costs.
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